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The Role of Governance on Private Investment in
Nigeria: A Preliminary Analysis
Kazeem Bello Ajide, Ph.D .
Abstract

The paper sets out to investigate the role of governance on domestic private investment in
Nigeria using Auto-Regressive Distributed Log (ARDL) Bounds Testing Approach to ascertain
long-run association on on annual data covering the 1970 to 2010 period. Emanated from
the estimated models ore intriguing findings which showed clearly that difference exists
between long and short run determinants of domestic private investment. In the former,
degree of openness, previous value of inflation rotes and governance indicators ore the
most important factors but political stability and voice and accountability indicators
appear to dominate the governance indicators space as they ore both negative and
significantly affecting the private investment mobilization. In the lotter, savings, real GDP,
degree of openness, real interest rotes, inflation rotes and governance measures ore
strong determining variables on private investment mobilization. Of the governance
indicators however, politico/ stability stood out prominently. A few re/otoble implications for
policy ore highlighted for the attention of policymakers.

Keywords: Domestic Private Investment, Governance, Bound Testing Approach,
Nigeria
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I.

Introduction

he recent global financial crisis, which engulfed world economy and
engendered reduction in foreign aids 1 to developing nations by the
developed countries, has consequently, rekindled research interests and
renewed vigour at searching for alternative means of driving long-term
sustainable economic growth. Though, in the development economics literature,
inexhaustible list of probable factors has been identified and explored as drivers
of growth. In the same vein, harnessing domestic investment has been found to
be one of the veritable transmission channels of driving the much-sought
sustainable economic growth if properly explored. However, it has been asserted
that a country's economic performance over time is determined to a large
extent by its governance performances (i.e. political, institutional, and legal
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' . For instance, post-financial crisis report showed that about US$ 70 billion of FD/ were estimated to be
cancelled in Africa in 2009 / 17% of the US$ 393 billion of total FD/ stock.).
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environment)2. In developing countries, particularly, the sub-Saharan African
countries (SSA) , harnessing domestic investment for growth is contingent on the
relative stability in the level of governance indicators 3 which are known to be
highly volatile for the region. As a corollary, countries within the region are
politically endowed with long histories of poor and bad governance. This
assertion is further corroborated by Akanbi (2010) when he submitted that poor
governance that is reflected in the unstable political environment in most African
countries has been a major hindrance to increasing domestic investment over
the years. Thus, modeling investment determinants for countries within the subregion requires accounting for the structure of governance. Failing to account
for governanc e indicators might make the study to be suffering from omitted
variables bias, thus making the emanated findings to be interpreted with a high
order of caution and while at the same time subjecting policy messages
therefrom to be viewed with a high degree of skepticism.
Nigeria, just like other African countries, has witnessed substantial reductions in her
share of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The influx of these flows dwindled in
the wake of the financial crisis thus portending that foreign capital or other
assistance as it were, may not be a sustainable source for long-term economic
growth. For instanc e , available statistics show that FDI fell by 60% from US$6 billion
in 2009 to $2.3 billion in 2010. Apart from these developments, the country has
also experienced a spate of crises occasioned by poor and bad governances.
Thus, accounting for the role of governance towards domestic investment
mobilization is the c entral focus of this paper.
Arguably, a large body of empirical studies has examined the determinants of
investment from both developed and developing nations' experiences but hardly
have studies from the latter controlled for governance indicators in their model
estimations. For instance, most studies from the developing economies exclusively
focused on the determinants of investment using macroeconomic and financial
variables while ignoring the role played by political institutions. Such studies
include Shafik, 1992; Oshikoya, 1994; Ghura and Godwin, 2000; Ndikumana 2000;
Du Toit and Moolman, 2004 and Bayraktar and Fofack, 2007. Fewer studies
however, only examined the importance of the country-specific institutional and
political environment as a determining factor in explaining investment. These
include Mody and Srinivasan (1998) , Altomonte (2000) , Bevan and Estrin (2000)
but Globerman and Shapiro (2002) specifically investigated how governance

See (OECD, 200 Ia) for more details
These include voice and accountability, political stability and a bsence of violence/terrorism,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law
2
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affects foreign direct investment (FOi) flows in developed and developing
economies. Also, Akanbi (2010) study's for Nigeria empirically examines the
pattern of domestic investment that is consistent with a neoclassical supply-side
model of the Nigerian economy. His results conform to the findings of existing
literature that real output, user cost of capital, and the level of financial
development are significant determinants of domestic investment in Nigeria.
In addition, most of the previous studies on investment employed different sets of
econometric methodologies in their empirical models such as single equation
(ordinary least square (OLS)) , the Engle Granger (1987) procedure and the
Johansen ( 1988) cointegration procedures to investigate determinants of
investment. All these estimation techniques and methodologies are not without
their inherent limitations. For instance, while the Johansen ( 1988) multivariate
cointegration method has the most obvious advantage of allowing estimation of
multiple cointegrating vectors where they exist, far too often, however,
practitioners fail to recognize that the application of the Johansen technique
presupposes that the underlying regressors are all integrated of order one
(Pesaran et al., 200 l). This is necessary because in the presence of a mixture of
stationary series and series containing a unit root, standard statistical inference
based on conventional likelihood ratio tests is no longer valid . Harris (1995), for
example, notes that the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests from the Johansen
procedure may lead to erroneous inferences when 1(0) variables are present in
the system since stationary series are likely to generate spurious cointegrating
relations with other variables in the model (De Vita et al, 2005).
Against this background, the primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the
role of governance on the domestic investment mobilization in Nigeria using a
more robust estimation method of an ARDL bound testing approach proposed by
Pesaran et al. (2001 ). The rest of the study is organized as follows; Section 2
reviews both theoretical and empirical studies on the determinants of domestic
investment in Nigeria. Section 3 presents the analytical framework, methodology
and the description of the data used in the study. Section 4 presents the
estimation results while section 5 concludes the study.
Literature Review
II.
This section offers an overview of both theoretical and empirical assessments on
the determinants of investment as it relates to both developed and developing
countries' experiences. This will enable the ensuing discussions to be put in the
proper context in what follows.
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11.1
Theoretical Review on Investment
Ever since Keynes who was one of the pioneers of investment theories carried out
an analysis which showed the ex post equality between savings and investment,
the offshoots of his submission later brought about some other investment theories
like accelerator theory of investment, neoclassical, Tobin's Q theory and
expected profits model. Hence, these theories were theoretically identified to
model investment in the existing investment literature.

A flexible accelerator model represents a general form of accelerator model. The
basic idea of this model is that the larger the gap between the existing stock of
capital and the desired capital stock, the larger a firm's investment would be. The
firm's desire is to strive as much as possible to close a fraction of the gap between
the desired capital stock K*, and the actual capital stock K, in each period. The
model is expressed as: I= ¢(K

0

0

-

K_,) where I stands for net investment, K =

desired capital stock K_, = last period's capital stock and ¢ = partial adjustment
coefficient. Within the framework of the flexible accelerator model, output,
internal funds, cost of external financing and other variables may be included as
determinants of K*. However a particular drawback of the neoclassical model is
that it does not rationalize the rate of investment or movement toward the
optimal capital stock.
Another version of accelerator theory is the neo-classical approach to
investment which was formulated by Jorgenson ( 1971 ) . In his own submission, he
0

posited that the K (desired capital stock) is proportional to output and the user
cost of capital (which in turn depends on the price of capital goods, the real rate
of interest, the rate of depreciation and the tax structure).
Tobin 's Q theory of investment associated with Tobin (1969) is concerned with the
ratio of the market value of the existing capital stock to its replacement cost (the
Q ratio), is the main force driving investment. That is to say, enterprises will want to
invest if the increase in the market value of an additional unit exceeds the
replacement cost. Tobin argues that delivery lags and increasing marginal cost of
investment are the reasons why Q would differ from unity. The main criticism of
the q theory is that its use tends to be chosen on an ad hoc basis rather than on
optimization theory. Thus, the theory is silent on the factors that govern the shape
and length of the distributed lag specification. Berndt ( 1990) also noted that in
real practice, the model is confronted with such problems as
measuring
marginal rather than average user cost of capital, accounting for intangibles that
affect market value and incorporating tax factors
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McKinnon ( 1973) and Shaw ( 1973) also formulated the neoliberal approach to
investment which stresses the importance of financial deepening and high
interest rates as drivers of economic growth. According to them, if an economy
were free up from repressive conditions, this would induce savings, investment
and economic growth. In their view, investment is positively related to the real
rate of interest in contrast with the neoclassical theory. This is made possible
because an increase in interest rates will lead to an increase in the volume of
financial savings through financial intermediaries and thereby raises investible
funds, a phenomenon that McKinnon (1973) calls the "conduit effect". The same
c riticisms of neo-classical also apply to this model since it is a variant of the same
model.
Recent studies on investment have also made prov1s1ons for uncertainty into
investment theory due to nature of its irreversibility (see Pindyck, 1991 for details).
He argued that since capital goods are often firm-specific and have a low resale
value; disinvestment is more costly than positive investment. His argument was
based on net present value rule 4 which he believed must be modified to reflect
an opportunity due to the irreversible nature since the firm cannot disinvest should
market conditions change adversely.
More importantly, Rodrik ( 1991) introduces element of uncertainty as another key
determinant of private investment. Apart from this, there are other theories
hinging on profits or profits earned by business units and industries instead of
output. This analysis of profit and investment relationship has several variants, one
of which is that investment is affected by current profits, the amount of retained
profits. or by other variables like output. price and sales, which reflect the profits
(Chirinko ( 1993). The profit theory posits that the greater the. gross profits, the
greater will be the level of internally generated funds and in turn the greater will
be the rate of investment (Zebib and Muoghalu, 1998).
In addition, there is the dis-equilibrium approach, whic h views investment as a
function of both profitability and demand for output. In this instance, investment
decisions have two stages: first is the decision to expand the level of productive
capacity, and second, is the decision about the capital intensity of the additional
capacity (Serven and Solimano, 1992). The first decision depends on the
expected degree of capacity utilisation in the economy, which provides an
indicator of demand conditions, while the second decision depends on relative
prices such as the cost of capital and labour. The investment decision takes
place in a setting in which firms may be facing current and expected future sales
'States that investment should be made whenever the value of a unit of capital is at least as its cost.
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constraints (Serven and Solimano, 1992). Therefore, investment depends both on
profitability and on the prevailing sales constraints, which determine the rate of
capacity utilisation (Serven and Solimano, 1992). Criticism of the models arises
because the models are not clear on the role of cash flow.
It is discernable from the brief theoretical expositions that private investment
variables can be drawn from different schools of thought namely: Keynesian,
neoclassical, neoliberal and uncertainty since each of them has its inherent
drawbacks.
11.2

A Brief Review of Previous Empirical Studies on Investment

Dailami and Walton ( 1992) examined the behavior of private investment in
Zimbabwe over the period 1970 to 1987. The results showed that private
investment is positively related to GNP growth, real interest rate, real effective
exchange rate, and the lagged dependent variable, and negatively related to
the government bond yield, relative price of capital goods, and real wage.
Asante (2000), analyzed the determinants of private investment in Ghana using a
time series analysis and complementing it with a cross-sectional one over the
period 1970- 1992. The results showed that the variables that had a significant
positive relationship with investment are: lagged investment, public investment,
private sector credit, real interest rate, and real exchange rate. Trade, political
instability, macroeconomic instability, and the growth rate of real GDP all had a
negative relationship with private investment. Ribeiro (2001) employed the
Johansen multivariate co-integration technique and Engle-Granger Two-step
approach to model private-sector investment in Brazil during the period 19561996. The results reveal a positive impact of output, public investment and
financial variables and the negative effect of exchange rate.
He also
conducted weak exogeneity and superexogeneity tests and the results
confirmed the importance of credit and public investment as economic policy
instruments.
Luintel and Mavrotas (2005) investigated domestic private investment behaviour
in a panel of 24 low-income and middle-income countries spanning the period
1981 -2000. The paper rigorously addresses (i) the cross-country heterogeneity in
private investment behaviour, and (ii) endogeneity. Indicators of financial sector
development and other standard macroeconomic determinants of private
investment appear significant in explaining private investment behaviour in the
sample; however, the estimated parameters and adjustment dynamics exhibit
important cross-country differences. Lesotlho (2006) support the existence of a
short-run dynamic adjustment and the long run equilibrium relationship between
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the macroeconomic variables used in the study and private investment level.
Public investment, bank credit to the private sector and the real interest rate
affect private investment level in the short run, while GDP growth and real
exchange rate affect private investment in the long run.
More recently, Frimpong and Marbuah (2010) sought an empirical assessment of
factors that have either stimulated or dampened private sector investment in
Ghana. Employing co-integration and error correction techniques within an ARDL
framework, their results suggest that private investment is determined in the shortrun by public investment, inflation, real interest rate, openness, real exchange
rate and a regime of constitutional rule, while real output, inflation, external debt,
real interest rate, openness and real exchange rate significantly influenced
private investment response in the long-run. Fowowe (2011) conducted an
empirical investigation of the effect of financial sector reforms on private
investment in selected Sub-Saharan African countries. An index is developed to
track the gradual progress made with the implementation of the phases of the
reforms. The results show that financial sector reforms (measured by the index)
have had a positive effect on private investment in the selected countriess
considered for his study, thus offering support to the financial liberalization
hypothesis.
It is instructive to note that even though the determinants of private domestic
investment have attracted some attention in the literature, it has not been
studied extensively in Nigeria. Among the few studies that have been considered
within the context of the Nigerian economy are Busari and Omoke (2008), Akanbi
(2010).
Busari and Omoke (2008) , presented an empirical assessment of the impact of
trade policy practice and its credibility on private investment using firm level data
of 67 Nigerian firms over the period 1980-2003. The results underscore the
robustness of the links among private investment, trade policy and
macroeconomic uncertainty. Many of the trade and volatility measures
considered show strong negative association with private investment.
Furthermore, the study observed that trade policy practices in Nigeria have
deterred investment by making the cost of importing high, which particularly
affects firms with high import intensity. In addition, the negative impact of real
exchange rate uncertainty on investment is significantly larger in firms that are
import intensive. Akanbi (2010) empirically examined the pattern of domestic
5 Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d'ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali. Mauritius
,Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe
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investment in Nigeria using a neoclassical supply-side model over the period 1970
to 2006. To achieve this objective, he therefore employed the Johansen
estimation techniques. The results show that real output, user cost of capital, and
the level of financial development a nd the governance indicators are significant
determinants of domestic investment in Nigeria.
11.3
Empirical Studies between Governance and Investment
The paticular literature that crafts a role for governance in investment
determinant space is still sparse and highly restricted to the developed countries,
and are mostly cross-country studies.. Examples of such studies include Ngov
(2008) and Aysan et al,(unpublished).

Ngov (2008) study focused on the impacts of governance on foreign direct
investment and promoting domestic investment and growth performance in
three different income group of countries: low income, middle income and high
income groups. Using intra-group regression method, he finds that governance is
positively correlated with per capita growth rate in the middle and high but not in
low income groups. Rather, governance is found to have a positive relationship
with total investment (domestic investment plus FDI) ratio but not with FDI inflow
ratio, suggesting the impacts of governance on domestic investment. Aysan et al
(unpublished) examined the governance institutions and private investment in
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Their results show the importance of
governance in private investment decisions. They were able to establish the
important component of administrative quality over less robust result of public
accountability. Their results also stress that structural reforms - such as financial
development and trade openness and human development affect private
investment decisions directly, and/or through their positive impact on
governance. Also, Aysan et al (unpublished) empirically show that the perceived
quality of governance is an important determinant of the private investment
decisions in the developing countries by stressing the existence of different types
of possible measures of governance. Different types of governance; namely
"Quality of Administration" (QA), "Political Accountability" (PA) and "Political
Stability" (PS) are confirmed to exert their influence on the private investment
through diverse mechanisms. All of the three indicators were proved to be
significant ~lthough at different levels of significance and magnitudes of
influence for private investment decisions.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparently clear that the particular literature that
crafts a role for governance in private investment determinant space is still
emerging, thus providing a justification for undertaking this study.

IOI
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Ill.
Methodology
This section contains the specification of the relationship between private
domestic investment and some of its determining variables, augmented with
governance indicators. Also, the description and measurement of the variables
used in the empirical analysis is presented. Finally, we expound the adopted
ARDL Bound Testing methodology approach.
111.1
Model and Variable Description
Against the background of the earlier arguments, on the determinants of private
domestic investment, the empirical model for this study is specified as:

PD/= f(RGDP,SAV,OPENX,RINR,INF,GOV _ IND)

(1)

where PDI is Private Domestic Investment, RGDP =Real GDP, INF=lnflation rate,
OPENX =Degree of Openness, RINR= Real Interest Rate, SAV=Savings and
GOV_IND=Governance Indicators. The governance indicators being a composite
variable are further decomposed6 as:

GOV _IND= f(VA,PS,GEF,REQ, ROL,CORR)

(2)

where VA=voice and accountability, PS=political stability, REQ=regulatory quality,
GEF=government effectiveness, ROL=rule of law and CORR= corruption, Thus,
equation ( 1) can explicitly be rewritten as:
+

+

+/-

+

+

+

+

+

+

PD/= f(RGDP,SAV ,OPENX,RINR,INF,VA,PS,GEF,REQ,ROL,CORR)

(3)

Generally, RGDP which is a measure of level of economic activities is used to
capture the aggregate demand conditions in the economy and it is expected to
exert a positive effect on private investment. INF measures macroeconomic
uncertainty, this adversely affects private domestic investment mobilization thus
justifying its negative hypothesized sign. OPENX is a measure of the level of the
country's integration into the world global market as well as international relations
which may be positive or negative depending on the country's external and
trade policies. RINR is a proxy for user cost of capital but it has a negative impact
on the private investment since higher interest rates tend to discourage the
borrowers from borrowing. Also, savings exert a positive impact on private
domestic investment mobilization. However, the impact of governance indicators
usually exerts a greater impact on private investment in the developing countries.
6

Using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) classific ation system.

102

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2013

According to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), governance indicators
are classified into 6 groups: (i) Voice and Accountability (VA)-measuring political,
civil and human rights; (ii) Political Stability (PS) measuring the likelihood of violent
threats to, change in, government, including terrorism; (iii) Government
Effectiveness (GEF) measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the
quality of public service delivery; (iv) Regulatory Quality (REQ) measuring the
incidence of market-friendly policies; (v) Rule of Law (ROL) measuring the quality
of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence; and (vi) Control of Corruption (CORR) measuring the
exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand
corruption and state capture.
Estimate of governance ranges from
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. To cap the
foregoing, annual data spanning the period 1970-2010 was used in the study. All
data were obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, 2012
and from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) , (2012).
IV.
Econometric Methodology
It is by now routine, in the empirical literature, to bump into formal tests of
stationarity. The underlying logic of this practise is not unconnected with the
spuriousness that epitomises both the estimates and inferences derived from
imposing intrinsically static estimation techniques on data that are more often
than not non-mean reverting. To this end, each of the variables entering the
estimable equation (3) should be tested for the presence or otherwise of unit
roots. However, the characteristics of the variables are looked into before delving
into the unit root tests.
IV.1
Estimation Technique
The study adopts an Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing
approach developed by Pesaran et al (2001) to model the long run determinants
of domestic private investment. This approach has some econometric
advantages over the Engle-Granger ( 1987) and maximum likelihood-based
approach proposed by Johansen and Juselius ( 1990) and Johansen ( 1991)
cointegration techniques. First, the bounds test does not require pre-testing of the
series to determine their order of integration since the test can be conducted
regardless of whether they are purely 1(1), purely 1(0), or fractionally integrated.
Second, endogeneity problems and inability to test hypotheses on the estimated
coefficients in the long-run associated with the Engle-Granger ( 1987) method are
avoided. According to Pesaran and Shin (1999), modeling the ARDL with the
appropriate lags will correct for both serial correlation and endogeneity
problems. Jalil et al (2008) argue that endogeneity is less of a problem if the
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estimated ARDL model is free of serial correlation. In this approach, all the
variables are assumed to be endogenous and the long run and short run
parameters of the model are estimated simultaneously (Khan et al, 2005). Third, as
argued in Narayan (2004) , the small sample properties of the bounds testing
approach are far superior to that of multivariate cointegration (Halicioglu, 2007).
The approach, therefore, modifies the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
framework while overcoming the inadequacies associated with the presence of
a mixture of 1(0) and I( 1) regressors in a Johansen-type framework. Secondly, the
long and short-run parameters of the model in question are estimated
simultaneously. Lastly, The ARDL has superior small sample properties compared
to the Johansen and Juselius ( 1990) cointegration test (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).
An ARDL representation of equation ( 1) can be specified as follows:

MNPRINV =1i10 +

f <»iMNPRJNV,-1 + 'twit.I,NRGDP,-1 + f,w MNSAV,-1 + f,w,MNOPENX1-1 +'f. w,MUNR,-1 +
3

/•I

f m6MNF;_, +
t=I

/=I

t

OJ1~V/4_, +

1- 1

q

l:c:1

t

/= I

msMS,_, +

#•I

t

OJ9~GEF;_, +

/=I

i=I

t OJ10MEQ,_,
/=I

q

.L/O, /lROL,_, + L/ll12tl.CORR1-1 + ),LNPRJNV,_, + Ai_LNRGDP,_, + ~LNSA v,_, +
l=l

l= l

(4)

Where !). is the first difference of a variable
LN indicates that the data set are expressed in natural logarithms,
ru0 is a constant

q is the maximum lag order,

cop••··· .. ··· ...co12 represent the short-run coefficients (short run dynamics),

A,, ...............), 2 correspond to the long-run coefficients,
i time trend, and,

µ, is the white noise error.

+

104

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2013

The implementation of the ARDL approach involves two stages. First, the
existence of the long-run nexus (cointegration) between the variables under
investigation is tested by computing the F-statistics for analyzing the significance
of the lagged levels of the variables. Pesaran and shin, 1999 and Narayan, 2004
have provided two sets of appropriate critical values for different numbers of
regressors (variables). This model contains an intercept or trend or both. One set
assumes that all the variables in the ARDL model are 1(0), and another assumes
that all the variables are 1(1). If the F-statistic lies above the upper-bound critical
value for a given significance level, the conclusion is that there is a non-spurious
long-run level relationship with the dependent variable. If the F-statistic lies below
the lower bound critical value, the conclusion is that there is no long-run level
relationship with the dependent variable. If it lies between the lower and the
upper limits, the result is inconclusive. The general form of the null and alternative
hypotheses for the F-statistic test is as follows:

Secondly, if the cointegration between variables is identified, then one can
undertake further analysis of long-run and short-run (error correction) relationship
between the variables.
The error c orrection representation of the series can be specified as follows:
q

~>

q

L

q

L

M..NPRINV = ri10 + f½M..NPRINV,.. , + (J)2M..JvRGDP,.. , +
t•I

q

t•I

q

q

t•I

q

q

L

L

M.NSA V,..., + (J)4M..Jv0PENX,.., + (J)/!,flJNR,..., +

1

i•I

q

l•I

q

'Iw MNF,_; +'Iw ~V~ -; + 'Iw Af>SH +'Iw ~GEF,_; + 'Iw, ~Q,_; +
1

6

q

where

~ is

9

8

i= l

i =I

i=l

0

i=l

i=l

q

·L,/iJ11MOL,_; +

Im llCORR,_ +~ECM,_ + µ,

1=1

1=1

12

1

1

(5)

the speed of adjustment coefficient and ECM is the residuals obtained

from equation (4) while other variables remain as earlier defined. The coefficient
of the lagged error correction term is expec ted to be negative and statistically
signific ant to further support the existence of a cointegrating relationship.
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V.
Empirical Results and Discussion
The descriptive statistics reveals that the governance indicators are very weak as
each of the indicator variables carries negative values coup led with low
correlation values. The mean values range between -0.909 and -1.539. For CORR,
in terms of spread, the mean value ranged from as high as -0.8 l O to as low as l .320. Of all the governance indicators, VA has the hig hest mean value of -0.590
and this is directly followed by PS indicator with -0.7 l 0. The least of the mean
values goes to PS with -2.050 and also has the highest dispersio n from the mean of
0.249. The mean va lue of a composite indicator, GOV_IND is - l .19 with the
maximum a nd minimum being -0.990 and - l .240, respectively. For the control
variables, suc h as SAV, RGDP, RINR, INF and OPX, the differences between their
minimum a nd maximum values are quite substa ntial.
Table.1 : Descriptive Statistics
PRINV
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probablllty
Sum
Sum Sq.
Dev.
Observations

254837.2
8176.100
3215478.
-279851.0
695944.4
3.017250
11.70452
191.6474
0.000000
10448324
1.94E+13
41

INF

19.407
13.700
72.800
3.200
16.175
1.637
5.056
25.521
0.000
795.700

RGDP

RINR

268149.1
265379.1
775525.7
4219.000
213769.0
0.665916
2.715863
3.168125
0.205140
10994113
1.83E+12

14.829
16.938
29.800
6.000
6.618
0.195
2.045
1.817
0.403
607.992
1751.689

OPENX

32.44634
37.10000
60.31000
2.250000
19.75231
-0.077737
1.549168
3.637188
0.162254
1330.300
15606.15

10465.29
41

41

41

SAV

41

472491.9
29651 .20
4118173.
341.6000
942134.6
2.403451
8.071410
83.41023
0.000000
19372169
3.55E+l3
41

Continuation on Table. 1

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probablllty

CORR

GEF

PS

REQ

ROL

VA

GOVIND

-1.102
-1.100
-0.810
-1.320
0.083
0.203
7.329
32.296
0.000

-0.989
-0.990
-0.800
-1.230
0 .075
-0.876
6.415
25.164
0.000

-1.539
-1.540
-0.710
-2.050
0.249
1.393
7.466
47.344
0.000

-0.920
-0.920
-0.750
-1.340
0.118
-1.974
7.952
68.510
0.000

-1.241
-1.240
-1 .060
-1.610
0.099
-1.545
7.511
51.087
0.000

-0.909
-0.910
-0.590
-1.670
0.21 4
-2.029
8.841
86.414
0.000

-1.119
- 1. 120
-0.990
-1.240
0.050
0.199
4.835
6.021
0.049
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-45.170

-40.560

-63.080

-37.730

-50.890

-37.260

-45.880

Sum Sq. Dev.

0.275

0.226

2.483

0.561

0.394

1.833

0.101

Observations

41

41

41

41

41

Sum

41

41

Source: Computed

Apart from the first moment statistics of the series. the results of other statistics are
also evident from the table. For instance. Jarque-Bera which measures whether
the series are normally distributed or not, also rejects the null hypotheses of
normality for all the variables in terms of their distribution.
Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of the distribution of the series. The
statistics also concur with the fact that all the variables as being normally
distributed. Lastly, skewness is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of the
series around the mean. The statistic for skewness shows that all the variables
except for CORR, PS and a composite governance indicator are negatively
skewed, implying that these distributions have long left tails.
As is the convention in contemporary time series investigations, to side step
spuriousness in the regression estimates we initially employ the well-known
Augmented Dicken Fuller and Philip-perron unit root tests. The tests could not
reject the null hypothesis of unit root in levels for variables like GOV_IND, REQ and
LNPRINV except for ADF (with intercept and trend) which then means that this
hypothesis is rejected in their first differences. Similar situations also occur for
variables like VA. GEF, ROL and CORR in both tests but differ when intercept and
trend are tested for.
Table.2: Unit Root Test Results
Varia ble

Interc ept without Trend
pp
ADF

LNPRINV
D(LNPRINV)
LNRGDP
D(LNRGDP)
LNSAV
D(LNSAV)
INF
D(INF)
OPENX
D(OPENX)
RINR
D(RINR)
VA

-1.7664
-10.59 15...

Intercept with Trend
pp
ADF

Remarks

-3.6751**

-3.3193..

-3.7045···

1(0)

-

-

-

1(1)

-2.3295

-2.0661

-5.4371••·

-1.8966

1(0)

-5.8298***
-0.3329

-6.1308***

-

-6.9165***

1(1)

-1.9095
-4.9633...

-1.1459
-5.281 1·•·

-2.2764

1(0)

-5.3576***

1(1)

-3.1608**
-6.1172

-3.1095**

-3.0546**

1(0)

-

-11.6086

1(1)

-2.8060*
-1.2129••·

-3.9912**

-2.5941
_9.7475••·

-3.9312**

1(0)
1(1)

-1 .4749

-1.5703
-9 .8500***

-1.9278
-9.9719••·

-2.8063
-10.0025••·

1(0)

-9.9239***
-2.8605

-2.9592

-2.8775

-2.9781

1(0)

-5.0363***
-3.2066**

-

-

-

I( 1)
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-

-

-6.3124...

-6.3199···

-1 .8273
-6.4211 ••·

-1.8273
-6.4693···

-1.9239
-6.4473···

-1.9239
-6.6196*••

-5.2667***

-5.1454••·

-

-2.0896
_5.7955••·

1(0)

-

-2.2902
-5.7371 ••·

-4.9338...

-4.0409···

-3.2158**

-3.1270··

1(0)

-

-

-

-

1(1)

-6.4533···

-4.6689

-2.4355

-2.3304

1(0)

D(ROL)

-

-

-6.9237···

-6.7234···

1(1)

CORR

-4.8890

-5.2672

-

-2.4365
_5.4972••·

-2.2204
-5.4498...

1(0)

-6.1447***

-6.0381•··

-3.4116**

-3.2932**

1(0)

D(VA)
PS
D(PS)
GEF
D(GEF)
REQ
D(REQ)
ROL

D(CORR)
GOV_IND
D(GOV_IND)

Notes: •••1••1•

indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
-

I( 1)
1(0)
1(1)
1(1)

1(1)
1(1)

By and large, it can be concluded that there are mixture of 1(0) and I( l) variables,
thus posing a problem of conducting cointegration analysis using Engle-Granger
and Johansen cointegration techniques. This is because both require all variables
to be integrated of order one ( l) before cointegration tests can be conducted.
An alternative technique that does not impose such restriction is the Autogressive
Distributed Lag Framework (ARDL) of Pesaran, et al (2001) and Pesaran and Shin
( 1999). The ARDL method allows for the inclusion of variables integrated or orders
zero (0) and one ( l) in the same cointegrating equation. We have adopted this
technique because both unit root tests show that all variables to be included in
the model are either integrated of orders Oand 1.
ARDL procedure comprises two steps. The first involves testing the null hypothesis
of no long run relationship between the levels of the variables. In order to do so,
an F-test with a non-standard distribution is employed. Pesaran, et al (2001) have
provided two sets of asymptotic critical values for this test for the cases when all
the variables are 1(0). If the computed F-statistics exceeds the lower critical value,
then the null hypothesis of no long run relationship can be rejected provided all
variables are either integrated of orders O or 1. On the other hand, if the F-statistic
is lower than the lower critical value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. If the
long run relationship exists, then the second step can be implemented. This
involves estimation of the ARDL model using either the AIC or SBC to select the
maximum order of lags to obtain long run coefficients. This method involves the
estimation of the error correction model (ECM) of the ARDL model.
In accordance with the ARDL method, cointegration tests are conducted to
examine the existence of long run relationship between the variables by
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computing the F-statistics for the joint significance of lagged levels of variables.
The F-statistics for each of the models is greater than the lower critical bounds at
both the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Therefore, we conclude that non-spurious
long run relationships actually exist in all the models. By implications long run
relationship exists between private domestic investment and its determinants and
we can proceed to obtain the long run coefficients.
Table.3: F-Statistics for Co-Integration Tests
Models

F-Statlstlcs

1

5.2648···

2

19.3216···

3

4.7115..

4

4_5533••

5

4.7289**

6

4.4511••

7

7.059r••

Notes: The critical value bounds are from Table Fin Pesaran and Pesaran (1997)
(with an intercept and no trend). They are 2.262-3.367 at the 90% significance
level, 2.649-3.3805 at the 95% significance level, and 3.516-4.781 at the 99%
significance level. ***(**)* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table.4 shows the level of associations which exist among the governance
indicators in order to avert the problems of multicollinearity that may be present.

CORR
GEF

PS
REQ
ROL
VC

CORR
1
-0.4520
-0.1930
0.3064
0.2373
0.0425

Table.4: Correlation Matrix
REQ
GEF
PS
1
-0.1951
-0.3988

1
0.0356

-0.2874
0.2535

0.0020
-0.1119

ROL

vc

1
0.0376

1

-0.1914

-0.0789

1

Source: Computed

From the table, it is apparent that there exists low correlation among the variables
of interest as the values ranged between 0.3064 (highest) and --0.4520 (lowest) . It
is thus plausible to include all the governance variables in the same model
(possibility of multi-collinearity).
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Table.5 presents different estimates of long run private domestic investment
models with each having different governance indicators. In model 1 of the
table, it is observed that of all the variables of interest, OPENX is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This result is plausible considering the high level of
dependence of most private investors on imported inputs or resources for
production. Thus, liberalization has facilitated easy movements of resources,
goods and labour from one location to another without any undue hindrance.
Interestingly, it is the only variable which appears to be highly significant across all
the models. The RGDP is statistically significant in five out of the eight models but
carries the negative sign in all the models. This is a repudiation of economic
theory which postulates positive relationship between RGDP and investment. This
result contradicts most findings in many empirical studies in the literature like
Ibrahim (2000) , Asante (2000) , Akpalu (2002), Outtarra (2005) , among other
studies. This may be explained, in part, by the level and extent of corruptive
tendencies and other forms of rent-seeking attitudes among the political office
holders or those that may be referred to as " public resource managers" in the
Nigerian political system. SAV variable bears the expected sign in all the models.
This findings support the theoretical postulations that hypothesize positive
relationship between private domestic investment and savings. The variable of
RINR is statistically significant just like saving but has the expected negative sign
across the models. This may be attributed to the high cost of borrowings by the
private investors from the financial institutions. This result contrasts with the
empirical findings obtained by Asante (2000) and Frimpong and Marbuah (20 10)
for Ghana. The inflation variable is also significant in a large number of the
models but has a positive as opposed to the theoretically expected negative
sign. The positive sign of inflation is a repudiation of the economic postulate that
requires private domestic investment to thrive well in a low and stable inflation
environment. The corollary of this finding is that as prices of goods and services
are soaring higher in Nigeria, a profit maximizing rational agent sees it as an
opportunity to make abnormal profits, thus venturing into such businesses in order
to partake in the perceived excessive gains. This result is consistent with studies
like Acosta and Loza (2005) for Argentina and Frimpong and Marbuah (2010) for
Ghana. This further confirms Ajide and Lawanson (2012) study for Nigeria.
Also worthy of note, is the political stability indicators which appears to be
statistically significant at the 1% level out of all the governance indicators. This
corroborates the results of our descriptive statistics in Table, 1. Really, the history of
politic al unrests is as old as Nigeria itself but the situation became heightened
after the enthronement of democratic structures. The country has witnessed and
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is still witnessing spate of killings, wanton destruction of properties, civil
disturbances by the day. All the indicators are negative, thus portending their
bad states but are no longer regarded or perceived as such in the Nigerian
context; more specifically that corruption has been receptively institutionalized. In
Model 8 where each of the indicator is treated as independent, only PS and ROL
are statistically significant but at d ifferent conventional levels. COR is control of
corruption and not corruption index, thus it is expected to exert positive impact
on investment, however these variables are not statistically significant, thus. no
basis for the analysis; it is only political stability measure that is significant.
In addition, the models pass all diagnostic tests for non-normality of error term,
white heteroskedasticity, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, model
specification and serial correlation,
Table.5: Dependent variable: LNPRINV- Long Run Estimates of Governance and
Private Domestic Investment Determinants
(ARDL(l , 1, 1,0,1, 1, 1,0, 1, 1,0, 1) selected based on AIC
Independent
Variables

Model
1

Model

Constant

18.287
(3.019) ...

2
-3.653
(-0.734)

LNRGDP

-1.415
(-1.620)

-0.793
(-1.390)

LNSAV

0.819
(l.901)*
0.146
(3.174)···

0.325
( 1.114)

-0.245
(-1.963)*
0.069
(2.017) ..

-0.050
(-0.570)
0.035
(1.502)

OPENX
RINR
INF
VA
PS

GEF
REQ
ROL
CORR
GOV_IND

0.094
(3.133)···

Model

Model

Model

3
23.043
(2.665)**
-1.824
(-2.135)**
0.992
(2.318)**
0.176
(4.109)···

4
14.559
( 1.844)*
- 1.810
(-2.095)**
1.025
(2.367)**
0.174
(3.928)···

5

-0.286
(-2.296) ..

-0.301
(-2.380)**
0.076
(2.194)**

0.074
(2.135)**

Model

Model
7

Model

(1.864)*

-12.185
(-1.064)

8
-9.948
(-0.957)

- 1.86 l
(-2.147)**

-1.794
(-2.327)**

-0.804
(-1.376)

1.032
(2.409)**

1.005
(2.259)**

0.171
(3.940)···

0.180
(4.14 lj••·

1.057
(2.733)··
0. 164
(4.209)···

0.320
(1.075)
0.090
(2.771)**

-0.303
(-2.428)**
0.075
(2.184) ..

-0.293
(-2.219)··

-0.293
(-2.608)··

-0.033
(-0.366)

0.076
(2.157)**

0.070
(2.225)**

0.029
(l.271)

10.765
(l.165)
-1.796
(-2.100)**

6
17.170

-2.456
(-1 .266)
-1 1.055
(6.561)*..

4.081
(1.654)
-10.105
(7.069)···

2.348
(0.467)
3.331
(0.644)
-11.566

5.963
(0.936)
-2.522
(-0.587)
-4.835
(-0.967)

( 1.800)·
5.619
(0.816)

-0.208
(-0.034)
-25.805
(2.961) ..
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0.36

0.44
0.34

0.55
0.48

0.81
0.74

0.32(0.43

0.33(0.38)

0.35(0.42)

0.37(0.39)

0.77(0.69)

0.79[0.77]

1.05(0.52)

0.16(0.32]

0.20[0.35)

0.26(0.42)

0.89(18)

0.78(0.23)

0.33(0.22)

0.92(0.39)

0.78(0.38)

0.74(0.46]

R-Squared

0.48

0.77

0.45

Adj R2

0.39

0.73

0.36
0.35
Diagnostic Statistics

0.34(0.46]

0.31(0.37]

2
X NORMAL
2

0.29(0.32]

0.45

0.46(0.52)

I
1.02(0.54)

0.98(0.66)

0.89(0.59)

0.96(0.53)

0.89(0.51

0.21(0.12)

0.32(0.25)

0.35(0.43)

0.16(0.21)

0.19(0.33

XwHITH
2
X ARCH
2

I
I
1.15(0.32)

1.11(0.23)

1.09[0.15)

1.10[0.11 J

X RESET
2

X sERIAL

0.45

0.96(0.22

l
0.87(0.42)

0.76(0.55)

0.80[0.44)

0.86(0.56]

0.82(0.56

I

Notes: (i) ***(..)* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (ii)
Figures in parenthesis () and [ ] are T-ratios and standard errors respectively.
In order to see the short run dynamics, the empirical estimates of the error
correction models are presented in Table 6.
The results of the short-run dynamics associated with the ARDL are reported in
Table 6. The coefficients of the lagged error correction terms for the models
range between -0.2446 and -0.8587, are negatives and statistically significant
though at various conventional levels but models 3 and 6 have non-significant
ecm term. The negative and significant coefficient is an indication of
cointegrating relationship between private domestic investment and its
determinants, inclusive of governance indicators except for government
effectiveness (GEF) and corruption (CORR) which are insignificant. The
magnitude of the ecm coefficients indicates the proportion of the disequilibrium
caused by previous period's shocks that converges back to the long-run
equilibrium in the current year. However, voice accountability (VS) and political
stability (PS) indicators revert back to their long run equilibrium than any other
governance indicators.
Also, the results are quite intriguing as the signs of some variables contradict a
priori expectation, for instance, LNRGDP, LNSAV and INF. The coefficients of the
current OPENX for all the models though carry the expected signs and at the
same time statistically significant across the models. This in effect, suggests the
importance of liberalization policies in promoting private domestic investment
mobilization in the short run. The previous year's value of OPENX also exerts
positive impacts but limited to models 1, 4, 6 and 7. Just like the values of the long
run estimates, the coefficients of each of the LNRGDPs bear negative values
across the models, albeit insignificant at any level of significance. The coefficients
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of SAV also fail to conform to the hypothesized signs thus disproving the
theoretical economic postulations. The discernable implications are that in the
short term savings or investment funds are not usually channelled towards
promoting private domestic investment as one would expect. Alternatively,
anecdotal evidences have shown that such funds are usually diverted into other
non-productive activities.
Table. 6: Error Correction Representation for ARDL Model Private Domestic
Investment Equations
Independent
Vartables
Constant
D(LNPRINV

(-1)

Model 1
0.6915
(0.8325)
-0.3329
(-1.7848)*

Model2

Model3

0.6906
(1.0840)

0.911 0
(0.8773)

-0.0809
(-0.4216)

-0.5105

(·

Model4
0.7448
(0.7560)
-0.4080
(-2.0894) ..

Model5
0.6115
(0.5681)
-0.4137
(-2.1226)

2.5118) ..
D(LNRGDP)

-0.4843
(-0.4108)

0.0575
(0.0582)

-0.5889
(-0.4364)

D(LNRGDP

-1.1288
(-0.9481)

-0.5839
(-0.6366)

-1.2915
(-0.9611)

D(LNSAV)

-1.0647
(-0.5012)

D(LNSAV( -1)

-0.9841
(-0.3973)

-0.7903
(-0.47141
-1.6296
(-0.8885)

D(OPENX)

0.0950
(2.5623) ..

0.0735
( 1.8662)*

-3.1970
(-1.1842)
0.9920
(0.2752)
0.0964
( 1.9103)*

D(OPENX( -1)

0.0842
(2.1066)**

0.0432
(1.3815)

D(RINR)

-0.0650
(-0.4530)
0.0466
(0.3092)
0.0381
( 1.2940)

-0.0632
(-0.5624)
-0.0432
(-0.3587)
-0.0064
(-0.2735)

0.0533
(1.5984)
-4.1694
(-1.4248)

0.0326
( 1.1333)

( • 1)

D(RINR(-1)
D(INF)
D(INF(-1)
D(VA)
D(VA(- 1)
D(PS)

(·

-0.3649
(-0.4018)
-0.5298
(-2.8464) ..

2.3430) ..
-0.7104
(-0.5114)
- 1.3407
(-0.9379)

-0.9193
(-0.6723)
-1.5777
(-1.1238)

-0.8290
(-0.3198)
-0.9610
(-0.3270)
0.1074
(2.3411) ..

-0.7661
(-0.2259)
0.1043
(2.1696)

0.0718
(1.6373)

0.0867
( 1.8185)*

0.0908
(1.8036)

-0.9488
(-0.2788)
0.1031
(2.3776)**
0.1108
(2.3998)••

0.1318
(2.7789)··

-0.0267
(-0.1562)

-0.0908
(-0.5489)

-0.0848
(-0.4804)

-0.0753
(-0.4595)

0.0103
(0.0713)

-0.0008
(-0.0050)
0.0233
(0.6940)

-0.0327
(-0.1907)
0.0238
(0.6928)

-0.0304
(-0.1672)
0.0208
(0.5944)

-0.0588
(-0.3515)
0.0241
(0.7223)

0.0435
(0.2838)
0.0116
(0.3916)

0.0797
(2.1924)•·

0.0878
(2.3825)**

0.0874
(2.2259)···

0.0885
(2.5000) ..

0.0721
(2.1882) ..

-5.0955
(-1.8080)*
-7.4098
4.3296) ...

D(GEF)

0.3327
(0.3139)
-0.4587

Model 7

-0.7193
(-0.5177)
-1.4315
(-0.9998)
-0.4177
(-0.1545)

(·
D(PS(- 1)

Model6

2.9912
(0.8073)
17.0153
( 1.5612)

1.3263
(0.4433)

-0.6524
(-0.5390)
-2.0613
(-1.6527)
1.8579
(0.7930)
1.3047
(0.5016)
0.0603
( 1.4573)
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-2.0877
(-0.2138)

O{GEF(-1)
O{REQ}

-1.7568
(-0.4285)

O{REQ(-1}

- 1.1743
(-0.2960)
-3.8290
(-0.6390)
-0.7937
(-0.1198)

O{ROL}
D(ROL(-1)
D(CORR}

-12.9280
(-1.3282)

D(CORR(-1)

0.8531
(0.0918)

O{GOV_IND}
ECM?(-1}

-0.8587
(3.7554)***

-0.8407
(3.6897)***

-0.2717
(-1.1895)

-0.3634
(-1.7250)*

-0.3671
(-1.7440)*

-0.2446
(-1.1269)

R-Squared

0.78

0.87

0.73

0.70

0.70

0.71

Adj R2

0.66

0.80

0.57

0.52

0.52

0.55

2

-7.2622
(-0.9118)
-0.3923
(-1.7603)*
0.77
0.64

0.69(0.76)

0.57(0.67)

Diagnostic Statistics
0.59(0.62)
0.72(0.62)

0.62(0.63)

0.53(0.58)

0.52(0.47)

0.82(0.64)

0.78(0.66)

0.89(0.69)

0.86(0.53)

0.79(0.57)

0.77(0.62)

0.79(0.57)

1.10(0.78)

0.92(0.65)

0.85(0.63)

0.96(0.71)

0.89(0.73)

0.76(0.72)

1.20(0.65)

1.05(0.79)

1.01(0.83)

1.09(0.85)

1.10(0.81)

0.96(0.82)

0.89[78)

1.08(0.89)

0.97(0.72)

0.73[0.56)

0.80[0.49]

0.86[0.66)

0.82(0.76)

0.77(0.69)

0.74[0.68)

XNORMAL

2
XwHITE

2
XARCH

2
XRESET

2
XsERIAL

Notes: (i) ***(**)* indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (ii)
Figures in parenthesis () and [ ] are T-ratios and standard errors respectively.
The real interest rates denoted by RINR conform to the a priori expectation but
insignificant across the models. In an economic sense, negative interest rates are
a drag on investment stimulations both at the domestic and foreign levels as the
case may be. Interestingly also is the fact that the previous values of inflation
rates significantly impacted on domestic investment in the short run models
except for models 1 and 2 whose t-values are non-significant.
In addition, of all the governance indicators, PS is statistically significant at the 1%
level except for the previous value of VA which also appears significant at the
10% level. Expectedly, the a priori signs are negatives except for GEF which

114

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2013

c arries a positive sign. This possibly suggests improvements in the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility/commitment of the government.
Just as in Table.5, all the models pass the diagnostic tests for non-normality of the
error
term,
white
heteroskedasticity,
autoregressive
conditional
heteroskedasticity, model specification and serial correlation.
VI.
Conclusion and Polley Prescriptions
The immeasurable costs of the recent global financial crisis on developing
economies, particularly countries within the sub-Saharan African region
occasioning substantial reduction in FDI and other foreign assistance flows, has
called for renewed interests at searching for alternative means of driving
economic growth. Evidently, private domestic investment remains one of the
surest and veritable financing means that is easily accessible by countries but the
mobilization of which in SSA countries is believed to be largely determined by the
relative stability in the structure of governance indicators. To empirically confirm
this assertion, this paper examined the role of governance on the private
domestic mobilization in Nigeria over the period 1970 to 2010. Quite intriguing are
the results obtained where variations are seen to exist in the determinants of
private domestic investment both in the short and long run . In the former, degree
of openness, previous value of inflation rates and governance indicators are the
most important factors influencing private domestic investment mobilization.

Political stability and voice and accountability indicators appear to dominate the
governance indicators space as they are both negative and significantly
constituting drags on the private investment. On the other hand, in the long run,
saving, real GDP, degree of openness, real interest rates, inflation rates and
governance measures are strong determining variables on private investment
mobilization. Of the governance indicators however, political stability stood out
prominently while the not-too-visible effect of the voice and accountability
governance indicator peters out over the long run horizons. A few relatable
implications for policy are: since all measures of governance are negative
thereby portending their diminutive impacts on private investment generation but
with political stability indicator significantly featured prominently in both horizons,
efforts should be directed at settling any course of action that could breed
political impasse among the warring factions in the country. Also, fundamental
human rights, improvements in the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility/commitment of the government and other components of
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governance indicators should be strengthened and duly observed. In addition,
minimizing adverse cost of inflation, setting of tolerable real interest rates,
adoption of fettering liberalization policies and encouraging thrift habits w ith the
p ledge of reaping bumper gains in the future will go a long way in guaranteeing
private domestic investment.
Given the fact that research on governance-investment nexus is still emerging, it
is suggested that future research endeavour should try to employ alternative
methodologies 7 for the country so as to be able to either validate or refute the
obtained results. The basic limitation of the study, however, stems from the
paucity of governanc e indicators data which can only be assessed from 1996. In
addition, future studies should try to account for both regime shifts and structural
breaks.

7

ARDL has problems of m ulticollinearity, endogeneity and possible autocorrelations,
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